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The recession that officially began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009 is the 
most severe that the United States economy has experienced since the 1930s. The post-
recession recovery has been exceptionally weak and unemployment remains 
unusually high. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (bls) recognized that “the 
employment decline experienced during the December 2007-June 2009 recession 
was greater than that of any recession of recent decades,” and 47 months after it 
started, in November 2011, “employment was still over 4 percent lower than when 
the recession began.” In February 2012, the bls pointed out “that many of the sta-
tistics that describe the U.S. economy have yet to return to their pre-recession values” 
and that the proportion of long-term unemployed (those unemployed for 27 weeks 
or longer) remained notably high (usdol 2012b).
As of July 2012, three years after the recession had officially ended, the 
unemployment rate stood at 8.3 percent. There were 12.8 million people unem-
ployed and 40.7 percent of these, or 5.2 million, were long-term unemployed; and 
8.2 million persons involuntarily worked part time, because they had not been 
able to find full-time work. Another 2.5 million were considered only marginally 
attached to the labor force because although they were available for work and 
wanted to work, and had looked for a job sometime in the previous 12 months, they 
had not looked for a job in the 4 weeks prior to being surveyed. Over one-third (34 per-
cent or 852 000) of those counted as marginally attached to the labor force are 
listed as discouraged workers, persons not currently looking for work because they 
believe no jobs are available for them. In other words, three years after the recession 
ended, 23.5 million people, or 15 percent of the labor force, were either unemployed 
or underemployed (usdol 2012c). Furthermore, since the recession began, the 
labor force participation rate has declined from an annual average of 66.0 percent 
in 2007 to 63.7 percent in July 2012. The number of persons 16 years old and over 
counted as not in the labor force rose from an annual average of 78.7 million in 2007 
to 88.3 million as of July 2012 (usdol 2008; 2012c).
*  Researcher at the Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte (Cisan), Universidad Nacional 
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Over the past two decades, Latino immigrants have been an important com-
ponent of labor force growth in the United States. They were responsible for 54 per-
cent of the increase in the labor force between 2000 and 2010 (Kochhar 2012), 
and in 2010 slightly more than half the Latinos in the labor force (51.1 percent) 
were immigrants (Motel 2012). Before the 2008-2009 recession, Mexican and 
other Latin American immigrants easily found work in several labor market niches 
where their participation had grown rapidly during the 1990s and the first part of 
the 2000s: construction, meat packing, poultry processing, crop production, vari-
ous branches of food processing, plant nurseries and landscaping services, building 
cleaning and maintenance, and personal care for children or the elderly, among oth-
ers. The recession brought high levels of unemployment for all. Throughout the 
economic decline, from the beginning of 2008 until the middle of 2009 and the weak 
recovery thereafter, unemployment for Latinos was consistently higher than 
the rate for non-Hispanic whites and lower than the rate for blacks, just as it has been 
since the 1970s or earlier.
In this chapter, I analyze labor market outcomes for Latinos and Latino immi-
grants in the United States today, with special attention to Mexicans and those of 
Mexican origin, who constitute approximately two-thirds of the Latino population. 
I begin with some very brief comments on the history of labor migration to the U.S. 
and then analyze U.S. Department of Labor statistics to show how certain industries 
and occupations have become labor market niches for Latino workers. I examine job 
losses after 2007 and the evolution of employment between 2007 and 2010 in those 
industries and occupations with the highest numbers and percentages of Latino work-
ers. I discuss the increasing difficulties for Latino workers in the U.S. labor market 
since the onset of the 2008-2009 recession. I conclude with some references to 
the state of Georgia, where I conducted field work in 2009 and 2010, interviewing 
Mexican immigrants about their living and working conditions. The situation in 
Georgia illustrates some of the more far-reaching social and political consequences 
of the economic crisis, which may prove to be even more detrimental to immigrant 
workers, particularly the undocumented, than lost jobs and lower wages.
Historical Tendencies in Labor Migration 
To the United States
Attracting immigrant labor has been fundamental for economic growth in the 
United States throughout the nation’s history. Furthermore, the influx of migrants 
has more or less adapted to the ups and downs in economic activity and demographic 
tendencies within the country. The industrial boom at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury marked the beginning of a period of rapid growth, both absolute and relative, 
in the arrival of new immigrants. By 1910, the 13.5 million foreign-born in the 
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U.S. made up 14.7 percent of the population, almost equivalent to the historical 
high of 14.8 percent reached in 1890, when the number was 9.2 million (Gibson 
and Lennon 1999).
In the late nineteenth century, Chinese immigrants and later some other groups 
of Asians had been prohibited entry to the United States. For most other national 
origins, the first quantitative restrictions placed on the number of newly arrived 
immigrants admitted were established in 1921. At that time, it was decided that the 
number of persons admitted from any one country could not exceed three percent 
of the total number of persons of that nationality residing in the U.S. in 1910. 
Exceptions were made for professionals, servants, and persons already living in the 
Western Hemisphere for more than a year. Lower percentages and a numerical limit, 
to be implemented over the next few years, were stipulated in the Immigration Act 
of 1924. Nevertheless, the total number of immigrants continued to grow, reaching 
14.2 million in 1930 (11.6 percent of the population), until the economic crisis re versed 
the tendency. From that point on, due to the combined effects of declining inflows, 
deaths, mass deportations of Mexicans, and voluntary return to their countries of 
origin by other groups, the number of immigrants residing in the U.S. dropped to 
9.6 million in 1970. This was only 4.7 percent of the total population, which had 
grown from 122.8 million in 1930 to 203.2 million (Gibson and Lennon 1999).
The 1970s marked a new inflection point. From then on the number of immi-
grants began to rise rapidly and stood at over 38 million in 2007. At that point the 
foreign-born were 12.6 percent of the population and 15.7 percent of the labor force. 
In addition to these changes, which to a certain extent responded to the economic 
and demographic changes taking place in the U.S. at the time, significant shifts 
occurred in immigrants’ countries of origin. Since colonial times and the subsequent 
establishment of the United States as an independent nation, the country had been 
increasingly populated by European immigrants and their descendants. The indig-
enous groups, or Native Americans, had been pushed ever further westward and 
to a large degree exterminated by the European settlers. During the first half of the 
twentieth century, Europeans continued to dominate the migratory flows, until 
the 1960s, when new trends began to emerge, not only in the case of immigration 
to the U.S., but worldwide as well.
Among other things, the post-World War II reconstruction and the later con-
solidation and expansion of the European Union brought growing prosperity to the 
region and converted several of the countries there into destinations for immi-
grants from other parts of the world. The increasingly unfavorable terms of trade 
for the primary goods exported by many Latin American countries, as well as gen-
erally unfavorable economic conditions there and significant population growth, 
turned many of them into immigrant-sending rather than immigrant-receiving 
countries. There were also political changes, and even armed conflicts, in parts of 
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Central America, Asia, and Eastern Europe, that have spurred emigration since 
the late twentieth century. 
Therefore, in the early years of the twenty-first century, Latin America became 
the most important region of origin for immigrants entering the U.S., followed by 
Asia, and then Europe to a much lesser degree. In 2007, 31 percent of all immi-
grants in the U.S. were from Mexico. The Philippines, India, and China followed 
in importance, with 4 percent each, and then came El Salvador, Vietnam, Korea, 
and Cuba, with 3 percent each. By that time, Canada accounted for only 2 percent. 
According to Migration Policy Institute (mpi) data, no European country figured 
in the top 10 counties of origin for immigrants to the U.S., and Europeans as a whole 
made up only 13 percent of the foreign-born population (Migration Policy Institute 
2009; U.S. Census Bureau 2008, 44).1 Approximately 27 percent of all immi-
grants in the U.S. were from Asia, and about 54 percent were from Latin America 
(including Mexico).
Given the fact that the native-born population has been aging rapidly over the 
past few decades, immigrants in general, and Latin American immigrants in par-
ticular, constitute an increasingly important component of the U.S. labor force. At 
the end of the twentieth century the contribution of new immigrants to labor force 
growth was the highest it had been over the previous 60 years. The eight million new 
immigrants who joined the labor force between 1990 and 2001 accounted for 50 
percent of the growth during that period (Sum, Fogg, and Harrington 2002).2
In general, growth in the U.S. labor force has slowed down after the 1970s. 
Over that decade it rose by 29.9 percent due to the incorporation of those born 
during the post war “baby boom” and increasing participation by women. During 
the 1990s, the labor force only grew by 11.5 percent, but without the newly arrived 
immigrants who entered the job market, growth would have been only 5 percent. 
The tendency has been much the same for the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury; in other words, at least half or more of the growth in the labor force has been 
the result of immigration. There is a more or less generalized consensus among 
economists that the absence of new immigrant workers would have significantly 
limited both employment and economic growth in general in the U.S. at that time 
(Sum, Fogg, and Harrington 2002; Council of Economic Advisers 2007).
1  The data presented in the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Fact Book (2011) included Ger-
many in fourth place, and the United Kingdom in tenth place, on their list of the main countries of 
origin for immigrants to the U.S. in 2005, but did not give figures. The mpi data (2009) does give per-
centages, and therefore I have used this data in the text since it seems more precise. In the 2000 census 
data, Germany was listed in ninth place as a country of origin for immigrants to the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom in tenth. 
2  Those considered “new immigrants” in the text by Sum and coauthors are those who arrived after 
1990.
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After the mild 2001 recession, and despite the greater difficulties in crossing 
the border after 9/11, Mexican migration grew significantly from then until mid-
2006. Furthermore, the number of undocumented immigrants entering the U.S. 
at that time was much higher than the number of authorized entries for Mexicans 
(Passel and Cohn 2009b). However the arrival of undocumented Mexicans declined 
significantly as of 2007, not because living and working conditions have improved in 
Mexico, but rather because possibilities for employment in the U.S. have declined. 
The 2008-2009 recession and the persistently high unemployment rates thereafter 
have discouraged many potential migrants. These fluctuations in migration flows 
are evidence of the growing complementarity and a certain degree of de facto inte-
gration between the two labor markets. The flow of migrant workers from Mexico 
adapts, in general, to the demand for labor in the U.S. 
In addition to the more or less normal cyclical fluctuations, the U.S. labor 
market has undergone some radical changes over the past few decades in response 
to the challenges posed by globalization and increased international competition. 
Employment in general for both skilled and unskilled workers has become less 
stable and many jobs are quite precarious. Technological innovations have made it 
possible for companies to eliminate jobs and contain wage increases. Manufacturing 
jobs have declined steadily from their peak level of 19.4 million in 1979 to just under 
14.1 million in 2010. However, as manufacturing jobs disappear, new opportunities 
have opened in the service sector, which now employs over 75 percent of the labor 
force. Patterns in the supply and demand for labor have changed considerably. The 
male labor force participation rate declined more or less steadily from 79.1 percent 
in 1971 to 70.5 percent in 2011. Meanwhile the participation rate for women rose 
from 43.4 percent in 1971 to 60 percent in 1999 and has declined slightly since then 
to 58.1 percent in 2011 (usdol 2012a). Many male workers displaced from relatively 
well-paying manufacturing jobs over the past few decades consider the wages preva-
lent in many of the new service sector jobs unacceptable and have preferred to leave 
the labor force. However, the supply of Mexican immigrants willing to accept those 
jobs grew considerably as long as companies in the U.S. were willing to hire them.
The sustained economic growth achieved in the 1980s and 1990s generated a 
rise in the demand for labor at both ends of the skills spectrum, in other words both 
very high and very low-skilled jobs. The U.S. attracted a wide range of professionals 
from all over the world. Most recently Asia stands out as the main source of highly 
skilled immigrants. Less skilled labor comes primarily from Mexico and also some 
parts of Central America and includes a high proportion of undocumented workers 
(Passel and Cohn 2009a, 2011). The question of how to deal with the over 11 million 
undocumented persons currently in the U.S. remains at the center of the unre-
solved debates over immigration reform. In spite of all the negative rhetoric and the 
large number of deportations since 2008, the number of undocumented persons in 
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the labor force —estimated to stand at around 8 million in 2010 or 5.2 percent of the 
labor force (Passel and Cohn 2011)— indicates a continued practice of hiring undoc-
umented workers whenever and wherever it is considered profitable and convenient. 
Some immigrant groups are clearly consolidating specific labor market niches for 
themselves. While most of the Asians are concentrated in certain technical and pro-
fessional areas, Mexicans and some of the other Latin Americans tend to be employed 
in construction, light manufacturing, and some services. Given the proliferation of 
Mexican and Mexican-origin workers in low-skilled, low-paying jobs, it is somewhat 
surprising to note that in 2006, Mexico was the second most important provider of 
highly skilled immigrants in the U.S., with 462 409, after India’s 599 361 (Giorguli and 
Gaspar 2008). However, taking into account the total number of immigrants from each 
country changes the perspective somewhat, since there are almost eight times more 
immigrants from Mexico in the U.S. than from any other country of origin.
Data on occupational distribution from the 2000 census clearly illustrate these 
proportional differences. At that time, the highest numbers of immigrants employed 
in management and professional occupations were from India (408 000), Mexico 
(358 000), China (320 000), and the Philippines (317 000). However, in relative terms 
the contrasts were quite clear. For Mexico those employed in management and pro-
fessional positions were only 8.1 percent of all the Mexican immigrants working 
in the US, whereas for India, China, and the Philippines, they were 64.5 percent, 
49.3 percent, and 38.8 percent respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2012).
There are clear tendencies with respect to immigrants’ countries of origin, their 
human capital, and their income levels in the United States. European and Asian 
immigrants’ high income levels are generally proportional to their high levels of edu-
cational attainment, which in many cases surpass that of the native-born population, 
and hence their highly favorable insertion in the U.S. labor market. In contrast, the 
high numbers of undocumented workers and the generally low levels of educational 
attainment characteristic of most recent Mexican immigrants leave them extremely 
vulnerable in terms of working conditions and salary levels. Nevertheless, wages 
deemed insufficient by many native-born workers are enough to attract Mexican 
immigrants as long as there is a demand for their labor.
Hispanics/Latinos in the United States 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Hispanics (or Latinos) emerged as the 
largest minority group in the United States, slightly surpassing the African-American 
population in the 2000 census count.3  Between 1966 and 2000 the U.S. population 
3  The term “Hispanic” was first used by the Census Bureau in the 1970s to designate persons born in 
Latin America or Spain and all persons born in the U.S. who are descendants of someone born in Latin 
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grew from 200 million to 300 million. The Latino component contributed with 
36 percent of the overall growth while the non-Hispanic white component only 
accounted for 34 percent of the total population increase (Pew Hispanic Center, 
2006). Currently the approximately 50.7 million Latinos constitute 16.4 percent of 
the total population (Motel 2012). According to Census Bureau projections, the num-
ber of Latinos will reach approximately 133 million by mid-century, equivalent to 
30 percent of the total projected population of 439 million (Roberts 2008).
The Latino population’s rapid growth is closely tied to the intense migratory 
flows experienced in recent decades. Out-migration from Mexico and other Latin 
American countries and Latino settlement in the U.S. are two sides of a single coin. 
They are part of a single process that is simultaneously exit and entry, departure and 
arrival, and the causes of which are inextricably tied to contemporary globalization. 
This is evident in both receiving and sending countries alike, with different and 
specific manifestations in each case. While departure frequently separates families 
and leaves social voids —often evidenced in villages and towns inhabited only by 
children and the elderly—, new Mexican and Latino neighborhoods are springing 
up in many parts of the U.S. previously unaffected by migration flows (see, for exam-
ple, Massey 2008; Odem and Lacy 2009).
According to the official 2010 census, there were 50.5 million Latinos in the U.S. 
distributed as follows: Mexicans, 63 percent; Puerto Ricans, 9.2 percent; Cubans, 
3.5 percent; Central Americans,4 7.9 percent; South Americans, 5.5 percent; Do mi n-
icans, 2.8 percent; Spaniards, 1.3 percent; and 6.8 percent of unspecified origin 
(Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011). About 37 percent of all Latinos are immi-
grants, which is very close to the proportion among those of Mexican origin (35.6 
percent in 2010). The percentage of immigrants is much lower among Spanish-origin 
Latinos (12.9 percent). In contrast, most of the South and Central Americans resid-
ing in the U.S. now are first-generation immigrants (Motel 2012).
During the 1990s, the Latino population rose by 12.9 million. More than half 
of this growth, 56 percent, was due to immigration, and the remaining 44 percent 
was from the natural increase of those already living in the U.S. This tendency was 
reversed in the first decade of the twenty-first century as the natural increase 
surpassed the number of newly arrived immigrants. The change was particularly 
evident for Mexicans. Their numbers rose by 11.4 million, of which 7.2 million 
America or Spain. Subsequently, and to a certain extent in rejection of a term viewed as imposed by 
the U.S. government, some of these persons began to refer to themselves as Latinos. The use or acceptance 
of either term may vary by region within the U.S. Currently in many academic and political circles 
both terms are used as synonymous and interchangeable, as will be the case in this text. 
4  According to the definition used in the report by Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert (2011), the category 
“Central American” excludes Mexicans and includes persons who reported themselves as Costa Rican, 
Guatemalan, Honduran, Nicaraguan, Panamanian, Salvadoran, from the Canal Zone, belonging to 
a Central American indigenous group, or simply as Central Americans. 
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(63 percent) can be attributed to births in the U.S. and only 4.2 million (37 per-
cent) to the arrival of new immigrants (Pew Hispanic Center 2011). 
Furthermore, for a variety of reasons, approximately 75 percent of all Latino 
immigrants have not yet become citizens of the United States. According to current 
legislation, legal permanent residents can become citizens after five years if they 
meet certain requirements. It is somewhat difficult to determine exactly how many 
Latino immigrants are legal residents and how many are undocumented. According 
to recent estimates, 58 percent of the approximately 11.2 million undocumented 
immigrants now living in the U.S. are Mexican, and another 23 percent come from 
other Latin American countries (Passel and Cohn 2011).
Due mainly to different levels of educational attainment, other types of train-
ing, and occupational distribution, considerable variations in socioeconomic levels 
exist among U.S.-born Latinos, as well as among Latino immigrants, and within 
each of the different groups that make up the Latino population as a whole. Some 
national-origin groups may contain political asylum seekers, people from different 
socioeconomic strata, as well as professional and international business migrants. 
Nevertheless, the majority of Latino immigrants in the U.S. today are “labor migrants” 
seeking employment opportunities and wage rates that they could not expect to find 
in their home countries.
Often statistics and data on Latinos are presented globally, without differenti-
ating among the various groups that constitute the Latino population as a whole. 
Therefore, some groups’ high levels of educational attainment and incomes are lost 
from sight in the aggregate figures because of the much lower levels of schooling 
and incomes characteristic of most Mexican and many Central American migrants. 
Furthermore, where distinctions are made, data will usually be presented for Mex-
icans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans with a catchall category for other Latinos, or at 
best a distinction between Central Americans and South Americans. In these latter 
cases, it is sometimes quite difficult to obtain information by national origin given the 
relatively small numbers from each country. 
Among Latinos in the U.S, Cubans and South Americans tend to have the 
highest income levels. In contrast, Mexicans and Central Americans have higher 
percentages of persons with low incomes and hence significant numbers of low-
income households. Puerto Ricans also have a considerable proportion of low-income 
households even though their individual earnings may not be as low as those of the 
last two groups mentioned. This can be explained by the fact that Puerto Rican men 
have low labor force participation rates and high unemployment rates, and there are 
a considerable number of female-headed households. The figure was 27 percent in 
2006, which was higher than that of any other group of Latinos. Furthermore, for 
all population groups in the U.S., women still tend to earn significantly less than men 
with similar education, skill levels, or training (Levine 2010).
 THE IMPACT OF THE 2008-2009 ECONOMIC CRISIS 29
Given the high percentage of immigrants, Latino men tend to have higher 
labor force participation rates than other groups, and the rates for Latina women 
are slightly lower than for others. As Graph 1 shows, differences also exist among the 
various Latino/a groups. Mexican men tend to have a considerably higher participa-
tion rate than Puerto Ricans or Cubans, and Puerto Rican women’s participation 
is slightly higher than that of other Latinas. As a result of the recession, male labor 
force participation fell between 2006 and 2010, while it rose somewhat for women, 
especially Cuban women, whose participation rate was only 49.9 percent in 2006 
(usdol 2007, 2011).
In 2010, unemployment rates (see Graph 2) reached their highest levels since 
the early 1980s, after having dropped to very low levels in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Between 2006 and 2010, unemployment rates increased by several per-
centage points for all population groups. Puerto Rican, African-American, and Cuban 
men experienced the greatest rise in unemployment, as did Cuban and Mexican 
women. The unemployment rate for Latinos as a whole generally falls between a 
higher rate for African-Americans and a lower rate for non-Hispanic whites.5 These 
relative positions in unemployment rates have held for the last three decades or more.
5  According to U.S. Census Bureau definitions, the terms “Hispanic” or “Latino” are ethnic, not racial 
descriptions; therefore, racially, Latinos may be either white or black. 
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To a certain degree, the entire Latino population has been stigmatized because 
of the high percentage of immigrants, and more specifically undocumented immi-
grants, among them. This is especially true for those in the lower socioeconomic 
strata because of their phenotype, their limited knowledge of English, the neigh-
borhoods the live in, and their low-skilled, low-paying jobs. Furthermore, given the 
preponderance of Mexicans, and in particular low-skilled Mexican workers, socio-
economic indicators for Latinos as a whole tend to be low, despite the fact that among 
South Americans and Cubans, in particular, and also Mexicans and Central Amer-
icans, there are many highly skilled immigrants with high incomes.
Salaries in most of the labor market niches with high numbers or high per-
centages of Latino workers tend to be low and, furthermore, have declined over the 
last few decades. Therefore, the prospects for socioeconomic mobility among new 
Latino immigrants are more limited now than in the past (Levine 2008). Most 
labor migrants with no college degree —which happens to be the case for the majori-
ty of Latin American immigrants to the U.S., given the high percentage of Mexicans 
in this situation— leave precarious, low-paying jobs in their home countries in search 
of precarious low-paying jobs in the U.S. or other parts of the world. Because of the 
existing wage differentials, which may be up to tenfold or more, they are, never-
theless, taking on what are usually the least desirable and lowest paying jobs in the 
destination country (Levine 2001, 2008).
grapH 2
u.s. unemployment rates (2010)
sourCe: Compiled by the author with data from the U.S. Department of Labor (2011).
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Mexicans and Other Latinos in the U.S. Labor Market
Since their main motivation for migrating is to get a job that pays in dollars, it is not 
surprising that Mexicans are currently the group with the highest labor force par-
ticipation rate in the U.S, 67.7 percent in 2010 (usdol 2011). The participation rate 
for Mexican men, 79.4 percent in 2010, is considerably higher than that of any 
other population group (whites, 72.0 percent; Afro-Americans, 65 percent; Asians, 
73.2 percent). Although the participation rate for Mexican women, 54.1 percent, is 
lower than for other groups (whites 58.5 percent, Afro-Americans 59.9 percent, 
Asians 57 percent), it is significantly higher than the labor force participation rate for 
women in Mexico, which is now 44 percent (inegi 2012).
Unemployment rates tend to reflect the cyclical changes in economic activity, as they 
usually rise and fall more or less in opposition to the rate of economic growth. As men-
tioned earlier, for the past three decades or more, unemployment rates for Latinos, 
and for Mexican-origin Latinos as well, have consistently been above the rate for 
whites,6 and below the rate for African-Americans. The unemployment rate for Mex-
icans is usually lower than for Puerto Ricans and higher than for Cubans. Cubans 
have habitually registered lower unemployment rates than whites as a whole (which, 
as mentioned before, includes most Latinos). However, in 2010, Cuban men had an 
unusually high unemployment rate (12.9 percent), which was slightly above the rate 
for Mexican men (12.3 percent), but not nearly as high as the extremely high rates for 
African-American men (18.4 percent) and Puerto Rican men (17.3 percent).
It is not unusual for some recent immigrants to hold the lowest paying, least 
desirable jobs in the U.S., which nevertheless provide much more than they could 
expect to earn in their home countries. This has been the case for most Mexican immi-
grants because of their low educational attainment, limited knowledge of English, 
and adverse labor market conditions in their home country. Unfortunately, the 
educational disadvantages often persist among second- and third-generation Mex-
icans born in the U.S. 
U.S. Department of Labor data for 2010 (see Table 1) indicate that the Mex-
ican-origin work force —in other words Mexican immigrants and their U.S.-born 
descendants— is more or less evenly distributed among three of the five major 
occupational categories: 19 percent in natural resources, construction, and main-
tenance occupations; 18.2 in production, transportation, and material moving 
occupations; and 19.9 percent in sales and office occupations. Their participation 
in management, professional, and related occupations (16.1 percent) is lower than for 
any other ethnic or racial group, and in service occupations it is higher (26.7 percent), 
6  The unemployment rate for non-Hispanic whites is lower than the figure indicated here, which is for 
all whites and therefore includes most Latinos, who tend to have higher unemployment rates than 
non-Hispanic whites.
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exceeding the rates for African-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans. Only 3 
percent of all Mexican-origin workers are currently employed in farming, fishing, and 
forestry occupations (which as of 2004 is no longer shown as an independent category 
and now employs less that 2 percent of the total labor force), but this proportion is 
much higher than that of any other group. Furthermore, 42 percent of all those 
working in such occupations nationwide are Latinos (usdol 2011).
In terms of occupational sub-categories, within the five major categories, 9.3 
percent of Mexicans were employed in professional and related occupations. A 
similar proportion, 9.7 percent, worked in manufacturing, and 12 percent worked in 
construction and extraction; in these two categories, some well-paying positions 
exist for highly skilled, experienced workers, but most are low-skilled, low-paying 
jobs. Eleven and four-tenths percent were employed in office and administrative 
support occupations. This category contains many female-dominated occupations, 
and earnings tend to be low. The same holds for sales and related occupations which 
employ 8.5 percent of the Mexican-origin work force. Food preparation and serving 
and related occupations, and building and grounds cleaning and maintenance employ 
9.6 percent and 9.8 percent, respectively, where wages are quite low. Within each of 
the general categories, Mexicans and other Latinos tend to be most heavily concen-
trated in a few specific occupations such as certain branches of light, rather than 
heavy, manufacturing; maids and housekeeping cleaners; grounds maintenance 
workers; dishwashers; cooks; and various types of construction work.
Between 1990 and 2010 the percentage of Latinos in the work force grew 
from 7.5 to 14.3 percent. The data for the number employed by detailed industry 
(see Table 2) show that some branches became increasingly dependent on Latino 
labor. Over the two decades considered here, the percent of Latino workers grew 
significantly in the following branches: support activities for agriculture and for-
estry, from 15.4 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2010; landscaping services, from 
25.2 to 41.5 percent; cut and sew apparel, from 22.6 to 34.8 percent; services to 
buildings and dwellings, from 18 to 35.6 percent; dry cleaning and laundry servic-
es, from 14.6 to 28.5 percent; and services to private households, from 17.6 to 
39.5 percent. In the general branch of food manufacturing, Latino participation 
grew from 14.1 to 27.6 percent, and growth was even more pronounced in some 
subsectors: animal slaughtering and processing went from 17.0 to 38.1 percent; and 
bakeries, except retail, from 13.0 to 31.8 percent. In some cases, Latino participation 
rates had reached slightly higher levels in 2007, before the recession, and in others 
it continued to grow, although minimally, even afterwards.
Construction and carpet and rug mills were the industries where the percent-
age of Latinos employed had increased the most between 1990 and 2007. In con-
struction, it rose from 8.5 percent in 1990 to 25.3 percent in 2007, with almost 3 
million Latinos employed. Given the severe impact the recession had on this 
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table 2
industries witH tHe HigHest perCent of latinos employed in u.s. 
(1990, 2007, and 2010)
Ordered by percent Latino in 2007
Industries
 Percent 
Latino 1990
 Percent 
Latino 2007
Percent 
Latino 2010
Total percent of Latinos employed 7.5 14.0 14.3
Landscaping services 25.2 43.7 41.5
Cutting and sewing apparel 22.6 39.6 34.8
Support activities for agriculture 
and forestry 15.4 37.1 35.5
Animal slaughtering and processing 17.0 35.2 38.1
Private households 17.6 34.8 39.5
Services to buildings and dwellings 18.0 33.1 35.6
Bakeries, except retail 13.0 31.7 31.8
Drycleaning and laundry services 14.6 31.2 28.5
Carpet and rug mills 10.1 29.4 49.0
Crop production 19.5 28.8 30.6
Car washes 22.5 27.8 34.8
Fruit and vegetable preserving 
and specialty foods 21.0 27.6 30.0
Construction 8.5 25.3 24.4
Traveler accommodation 15.2 24.8 24.4
Apparel, fabrics, and notions 
wholesale trade 15.2 23.7 21.8
Warehousing and storage 13.8 23.6 28.8
Retail bakeries 9.0 22.3 23.9
Groceries and related products 
wholesale trade 13.4 21.9 21.1
Restaurants and other food services 11.6 21.6 22.3
Barber shops 10.0 21.5 11.7
Cement, concrete, lime, and gypsum 
products 8.2 19.9 19.9
Source: Compiled by the author with data from usdol (1991, 2008, 2011).
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industry, the number of Latinos employed had dropped to only 2.1 million by 
2010, which was 24.4 percent of the total employed. Latino participation in carpet 
and rug manufacturing grew from 10.1 percent in 1990 to 29.4 percent in 2007. It 
dropped sharply to 19.2 percent in 2008 and registered a spectacular rebound to 
49 percent in 2010. However, the total number of persons employed in this industry 
is quite small, only 59 million in 2010. The small city of Dalton, Georgia (known as 
“carpet city” or the “carpet capital of the U.S.”), is the most important site for carpet 
and rug mills in the country; Latinos now constitute almost one-third of the total 
population in Whitfield County, where Dalton is located.
Latinos’ occupational and industrial concentration is closely tied to their geo-
graphic concentration, which is still quite pronounced despite significant dispersion 
to new destinations in recent years. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
75 percent of the Latino population resided in just seven states. However, some states 
in the Southeast, whose Latino populations are still numerically rather small, reg-
istered extraordinary growth rates (ranging from over 200 to almost 400 percent 
between 1990 and 2000) in their Latino populations because of the employment 
opportunities opening up there at that time. Mexicans and other Latinos have fre-
quently been actively recruited for jobs in meat packing, poultry processing, carpet 
manufacturing, or crop production, for example, that local residents disdain. It 
seems that all that is necessary to consolidate a labor market niche of this type is 
an influx of Latino immigrants and jobs that no one else wants, at least at the going 
wage rates. This has been very clear for agricultural work in states like California, 
Texas, and Oregon. The demand for labor for many undesirable, low-wage jobs 
grew significantly at the end of the twentieth century, just as new waves of immigrants 
were arriving from Mexico and other parts of Latin America who were more than 
willing to accept those jobs.
I have used the U.S. Department of Labor’s data on “Employed persons by 
detailed occupation, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity” to provide some 
insights about specific labor market niches for Mexican and other Latino immigrants. 
It should be pointed out that given the preponderance of Mexicans in the Latino 
labor force —almost two thirds of all Latino workers are Mexican or of Mexican 
origin— and the fact that the tendencies for the other two main groups, Puerto 
Ricans and Cubans, often diverge in opposite directions, data for Latinos as a whole 
can provide a fairly accurate approximation to labor market outcomes for Mex-
icans. Furthermore, slightly over half the Latinos employed in the U.S. in recent 
years are immigrants (Motel 2012).
Having analyzed these statistics over several years, I have been able to ascer-
tain that the occupations with the highest numbers of Latino workers are mainly 
low-skilled, low-paying jobs that do not require a college degree. The same holds 
true for occupations with the highest percentages of Latinos (Levine 2001, 2008, 
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2010). Moreover, most of the occupations with the highest percentages of Latinos 
in 2007 and in 2010 also had relatively high percentages of undocumented work-
ers prior to the onset of the recession at the end of 2007 (Passel 2006). Therefore, 
I will attempt to make some inferences about the recession’s impact on Latino 
immigrants in the U.S. labor force by observing the effects it had on Latino work-
ers in general.
Impacts of the Crisis on Latino Workers
At the height of the recession, Latinos had lost 863 800 jobs, or 14 percent of the 
6.2 million jobs that disappeared in the U.S. between 2007 and 2009, which was pro-
portional to their participation in the employed labor force at the time. The most 
severe loss for Latino workers was in the construction industry, where 720 000 
people were thrown out of work. In contrast, simultaneously, in some industries 
and occupations, they experienced slight job gains, which can most likely be 
explained by the lower cost of their labor. However, Latinos registered job losses in 
many of the occupations with relatively high percentages of Latino workers. Table 3 
shows the net changes between 2007 and 2010 in the number of Latino workers 
in the industries that employed the highest numbers of Latinos in 2007.
During 2010, when some sectors of the economy began to show mild signs of 
recovery, Latinos recuperated approximately 300 000 jobs, even though overall 
employment continued to decline. The economy as a whole lost an additional 813 000 
jobs, and therefore Latino participation in the workforce rose to 14.3 percent 
(usdol 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011). 
Analysis of the usdol detailed occupations data (see Table 4) shows that from 
2007 to 2010 Latinos suffered net job losses in most of the occupations with high 
numbers of Latino workers. The annual figures reveal that in general the sharpest 
losses occurred between 2008 and 2009, even though the patterns are somewhat 
different for each occupation. Such differences are surely tied to regional and 
local variations in industrial and occupational structures and as well as demo-
graphic variations and different outcomes for different population groups. It is 
definitely noteworthy that the mild recovery observed in some sectors of the econ-
omy produced a net increase in Latino employment in 2010, even though the 
overall level of employment continued to decline. Nevertheless, the total number 
of Latinos employed in 2010, 19 886 000, was still lower than it had been in 2007, 
when there were 20 447 000 Latinos working. Total employment continued to fall 
throughout 2010, but finally reversed the trend in 2011 as employment for non-
Latinos began to rise slowly.
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table 3
industries employing tHe HigHest numbers of latinos in tHe u.s. 
in 2007 and tHe CHanges from 2007 to 2010
Ordered by number of Latinos employed in 2007 
Number of Latinos
Industries  2007  2010
Net change 
2007-2010
Total Latinos employed, 16 years and over 20 446 580 19 886 152 -560 428 
Construction 2 999 568 2 214 788 -784 780 
Restaurants and other food services 1 697 112 1 761 031 63 919 
Elementary and secondary schools 845 937 903 310 57 373 
Landscaping services 560 234 489 700 -70 534 
Hospitals 458 535 543 663 85 128 
Services to buildings and dwellings 438 575 492 348 53 773 
Grocery stores 398 544 413 624 15 080 
Real estate 346 236 308 352 -37 884 
Traveler accommodation 340 752 319 396 -21 356 
Truck transportation 320 280 264 808 -55 472 
Department stores and discount stores 285 375 353 829 68 454 
Private households 282 924 263 465 -19 459 
Justice, public order, and safety activities 260 624 339 710 79 086 
Crop production 258 048 301 104 43 056 
Child day-care services 240 240 241 983 1 743 
Automotive repair and maintenance 238 329 243 080 4 751 
Colleges and universities, including junior colleges 227 392 279 318 51,926 
Banking and related activities 226 884 246 266 19 382 
Other amusement, gambling, and recreation industries 213 048 204 633 -8 415 
Insurance carriers and related activities 202 951 183 464 -19 487 
Employment services 184 851 192 643 7 792 
Home health-care services 184 128 177 504 -6 624 
Groceries and related products 182 427 177 029 -5 398 
Automobile dealers 172 746 150 795 -21 951 
Individual and family services 169 224 208 882 39 658 
Animal slaughtering and processing 167 904 179 832 11 928 
Clothing and accessory stores (except shoes) 167 660 185 031 17 371 
Non-depository credit and related activities 156 800 84 588 -72 212 
Physicians’ offices 153 080 175 902 22 822 
sourCe: Compiled by the author with data from usdol (2008, 2011).
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table 4
oCCupations employing tHe HigHest numbers of latinos in tHe u.s. 
in 2007 and tHe CHanges from 2007 to 2010
Ordered by number of Latinos employed in 2007
     2007    2010
Net change 
2007-2010
Total employed 16 years and over 146 047 000 139 064 000 -6 983 000 
Total Latinos employed 16 years and over 20 446 580 19 886 152 -560 428 
Occupations      Number of Latinos
Construction laborers 789 866 546 077 -243 789 
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 605 500 529 900 -75 600 
Cooks 601 090 634 075 32 985 
Grounds maintenance workers 591 408 523 410 -67 998 
Janitors and building cleaners 582 400 675 474 93 074 
Maids and housekeeping cleaners 576 508 574 056 -2 452 
Cashiers 513 740 506 767 -6 973 
Carpenters 490 656 319 194 -171 462 
Retail salespersons 426 024 450 182 24 158 
Laborers and freight, stock, and material 
movers, [by] hand 377 277 362 100 -15 177 
First-line supervisors/managers of retail 
sales workers 330 720 322 596 -8 124 
Secretaries and administrative assistants 316 293 289 708 -26 585 
Miscellaneous agricultural workers 313 497 330 989 17 492 
Waiters and waitresses 302 634 343 122 40 488 
Painters, construction, and maintenance 292 740 236 980 -55 760 
Customer service representatives 270 297 288 192 17 895 
Stock clerks and order fillers 261 576 281 008 19 432 
Nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides 259 302 283 416 24 114 
Managers, all other 237 860 246 330 8 470 
Production workers, all other 234 398 209 988 -24 410 
Child care workers 225 288 238 177 12 889 
Receptionists and information clerks 206 063 215 208 9 145 
Elementary and middle school teachers 203 067 205 349 2 282 
Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators 199 206 165 025 -34 181 
Supervisors/managers office 
and administrative support 184 077 167 277 -16 800 
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Packers and packagers, [by] hand 167 272 166 439 -833 
Pipelayers, plumbers, pipefitters, 
and steamfitters 160 310 109 408 -50 902 
Food preparation workers 159 354 169 929 10 575 
Automotive service technicians 
and mechanics 155 583 162 806 7 223 
Teacher assistants 153 892 145 866 -8 026 
Office clerks, general 151 386 155 064 3 678 
Supervisors/managers construction trades 
and extraction 145 962 108 735 -37 227 
Personal and home care aides 144 008 171 248 27 240 
Food service managers 143 286 140 160 -3 126 
Bookkeeping, accounting, and auditing clerks 141 550 114 136 -27 414 
Industrial truck and tractor operators 135 898 159 680 23 782 
Electricians 130 416 96 740 -33 676 
Drywall installers, ceiling tile installers, 
and tapers 124 352 100 206 -24 146 
sourCe: Compiled by the author with data from usdol (2008, 2011).
table 4 (Continuation)
oCCupations employing tHe HigHest numbers of latinos in tHe u.s. 
in 2007 and tHe CHanges from 2007 to 2010
Ordered by number of Latinos employed in 2007 
       2007     2010
Net change 
2007-2010
The employment behavior in specific industries and occupations and the 
impacts for specific groups in the labor force deserves a much more detailed anal-
ysis than can be provided here. In general, Rakesh Kochhar and his collaborators 
(2010) confirmed that during the first year of economic recovery, starting in July 
2009, the unemployment rate for immigrants began to fall slightly (a decline of 0.6 
percent), even though unemployment for native born workers continued to rise by 
0.5 percent. In spite of this employment growth, the total number of immigrants 
employed in mid-2010 remained below the pre-recession level. This was also the 
case among Latinos. The unemployment rate for Latino immigrants decreased 
slightly, from 11.0 percent in the second quarter of 2009 to 10.1 percent in the 
second quarter of 2010; meanwhile the rate for U.S.-born Latinos continued to 
rise, from 12.9 percent to 14.0 percent. Thus, as the economy began to turn around 
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and growth resumed, it seems that most of the initial gains in employment were 
for foreign-born rather than U.S.-born Latinos.
However, this small rise in immigrant employment, during what was officially 
the first year of economic recovery, was accompanied by a 4.5 percent decline in 
their earnings, whereas earnings for the native-born population fell by only 1 per-
cent. Furthermore, Latino immigrants suffered the greatest wage losses. Their 
median weekly earnings decreased 1.3 percent from 2008 to mid-2009 and an 
additional 5.8 percent by the second quarter of 2010. As Kochhar points out, 
“Hispanics are the only group of workers whose median earnings decreased during 
both the recession and the recovery”; and moreover, “The downward momentum 
in earnings for Latinos was led by immigrants” (2010, 20). As a result of these 
changes, by the second quarter of 2010, the median weekly earnings of native 
born workers stood at US$653, and for foreign-born workers it was US$525. At the 
same time, the median for all Latinos was US$480 and only US$422 for Latino immi-
grants (Kochhar 2010, 20). 
Undoubtedly, Latino workers and Latino immigrant workers have directly suf-
fered the effects of the most severe recession in the U.S. since the 1930s. They 
are among the millions who lost their jobs, or whose family members lost their 
jobs, and later lost their homes because they could not meet the mortgage pay-
ments. Most of the U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents who became 
unemployed during this recession have received at least some relief from unem-
ployment insurance payments, which are nevertheless certainly insufficient to 
compensate for their losses. Obviously, none of the unemployed, undocumented 
immigrant workers have received any benefits whatsoever.
Furthermore, the repercussions, both direct and indirect, of this “great reces-
sion” for Latino immigrants in particular, and to some extent for Latinos in general, 
go far beyond the immediate economic impacts. In some places, especially in 
some of the southeastern states, the hard times experienced throughout the coun-
try have generated hostility toward those who a few years earlier had been sought 
out and even actively recruited to fill thousands of jobs that local workers would 
not accept. I will briefly refer to the case of the state of Georgia, where I conducted 
field work during a sabbatical stay from August 2009 to July 2010, to show how the 
recession contributed to generating an extremely adverse social and political cli-
mate for Latino workers and their families.
Growing Hostility toward Latino Immigrants in Georgia
The number of immigrants in Georgia has grown tremendously over the last two 
decades —this is also the case in other states in the Southeast or other regions where 
previously there had been few immigrant workers—, rising from just 173 000 in 
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1990 to approximately one million in 2010. Two-thirds of these recent immigrants 
have settled in and around metropolitan Atlanta. They come from many different 
countries of origin, but more than half are Latin Americans and approximately 
one-third are from Mexico. Mainly as a result of these recent migratory flows, the 
Latino population in Georgia has grown from 109 000 in 1990 to 853 700 and 
increased from 1.7 to 9 percent of the state’s total population.
According to the Pew Hispanic Center’s “Demographic Profile of Hispanics in 
Georgia, 2010,” the state’s Latino population is now evenly divided between immi-
grants and U.S.-born Latinos. However the median age of Latino immigrants 
in the state is 32 and for U.S. born Latinos, it is only 11. This means that a signifi-
cant majority of the working-age Latinos are immigrants. The proportion of immi-
grants in Georgia’s Latino population is significantly higher than the national rate of 
37.1 percent in 2010 (Pew 2012; Motel 2012). Median income for Latinos in Geor-
gia was US$17 300 in 2010, in other words, US$2 049 less than in 2008 and US$2 700 
below the national median for all Latino workers in 2010. In contrast, median 
income for Latinos who worked full time year round was $29 000 in 2010, with a consid-
erable difference between the median for immigrants (US$25 000) and U.S.-born 
Latinos (US$34 800). 
Over half the immigrants in Georgia are presumed to be undocumented. 
However, this was not such a problematic issue during the economic boom years 
of the 1990s and early 2000s. It is well known that in the mid-1990s, undocu-
mented Mexicans were actively recruited to work in constructing the installations 
for the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, just as they had previously been sought to work 
in Dalton’s carpet mills and Gainesville’s poultry processing plants (Amescua 2006). 
However, only a decade later the political and economic climate had changed con-
siderably. In 2006, Georgia began to pass anti-immigrant laws that affected undoc-
umented workers. Four counties with high percentages of Latino immigrants have 
established 287(g) agreements with the federal Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment Agency (iCe),7 which allow local police to make inquiries about a person’s 
immigration status and as a result have led to the detention and deportation of 
thousands of undocumented immigrants.
Many of the 91 persons I interviewed at the Mexican Consulate in Atlanta 
reported that they had initially been attracted to Georgia because of the abundant 
job opportunities there and that often wages were higher and the cost of living 
lower than in other regions. The annualized individual median income of those 
interviewed was US$23 400, not much lower than the US$25 000 median for 
Latino immigrants nationwide. Median household income (for those interviewed) 
7  I am referring to what are known as “287(g) agreements” derived from section 287(g), “Delegation of 
Immigration Authority,” of the Immigration and Nationality Act, in accordance with the reforms estab-
lished as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of September 30, 1996. 
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was US$35 880, only US$1 020 below the national median for Latino immigrants. 
Almost half (48 percent) reported more than one person working per household. 
Most had been living in the U.S. for 10 years or less and only 36.4 percent had 
lived elsewhere in the U.S. before coming to Georgia. In all, 30 percent worked in 
construction-related occupations and 15.7 percent worked in restaurants.
Ten of the ninety-one persons interviewed reported having lost their jobs 
because of the recession, but only two said that they were planning to return to 
Mexico for that reason. Most of those interviewed had not returned to Mexico at 
any time since they arrived in the U.S. and had no plans to do so in the near future. 
Three women reported having entered the labor force because their husbands had 
lost their jobs or had their working hours cut back. Thirty-three persons (36.3 per-
cent of those interviewed) reported working fewer hours because of forced layoffs 
for several days or even weeks and in some cases months, and/or a considerable 
drop in the amount of overtime they had previously been accustomed to working. 
This was most prevalent for those employed in construction. However, when the 
interviews were conducted (between February and May 2010), almost all of them 
said that working hours had begun to rise again somewhat.
Some reported having to cut back on spending because of the recession and 
that their incomes were insufficient to cover their living expenses. They said the 
cost of living was going up at the same time that their income was going down. A 
few said that some family members and friends had left the state of Georgia 
because of the economic conditions related to the recession. Others mentioned the 
rise in detentions and “persecution” of Latinos as situations somehow related to 
the economic crisis. However, in Georgia in 2010, Mexican immigrants did not 
speak very freely about the problems they had because of being undocumented. In 
this respect, my experience was quite different from what it had been in Los Angeles 
ten years earlier, before 9/11, and long before Arizona’s sb1070, or Georgia’s Hb87 
and the 287g agreements in four Georgia counties.
It was mainly by means of other experiences, rather than from direct inter-
views, that I was able to perceive the effects that anti-immigrant actions have had 
on Latino communities in Georgia. By working as a volunteer in the office of an 
organization that defends Latinos’ human rights in Georgia, I could see the impact 
that detention and deportation policies were having on Latino residents in the 
state. My main task was simply to answer phone calls, take note of the situations 
callers reported, and write down the pertinent information. I also attended various 
meetings with community members seeking information about how to cope with 
the enforcement measures implemented in the counties where they lived and 
worked. Based on everything I saw and heard as a result of this experience, I am 
convinced that the intimidation, fear, emotional suffering, and human rights viola-
tions caused by anti-immigrant attitudes and persecutory actions prevalent in 
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Georgia over the past few years have had —and will continue to have— a more 
profound, devastating, and lasting impact on the individuals and communities 
affected than all the hardships and difficulties caused by the recession.
Information from a 2012 Department of Homeland Security report provides 
an example of the terrible injustices committed with the pretext of combatting 
what is referred to as “illegal” immigration. Thousands of minors under the age of 18, 
who are U.S. citizens by birth, have been separated from their parents; the parents, 
in turn, have lost parental rights and custody of their children because of their 
detention and deportation due to being undocumented immigrants. The report 
“Deportation of Parents of U.S.-Born Citizens” (usdHs 2012) provides data on the 
number of deportation, exclusion, and removal orders sought and obtained by iCe 
in order to expel from the U.S. foreigners who have U.S.-citizen minor children. 
During the first six months of 2011 (January 1 through June 30, 2011), iCe reports 
having expelled from the United States 46 846 foreigners who have at least one 
minor child that is a U.S. citizen.
It is interesting to note that 21 860 of the persons reported as expelled from 
the country had been detained for some period of time prior to their deportation 
and the numbers are registered by “District/area of responsibility (aor) in which 
the removal order was obtained.” The Atlanta district/aor showed the greatest 
number of removals, 2 249 or 10.3 percent of the total, reported for the six month 
period (usdHs 2012). In the vast majority of these cases, the circumstances would 
not have warranted detention, except for the fact that the individual involved was 
an undocumented immigrant. A recent study carried out by the Applied Research 
Center found that “a disturbing number of children with detained or deported par-
ents are now in foster care.” It was also the case that “in jurisdictions where local 
police aggressively participate in immigration enforcement (e.g., 287[g] and 
Secure Communities), children are more likely to be separated from their parents.” 
Furthermore, “once children of undocumented immigrants enter foster care, [this] 
research indicates that their families face significant barriers to family reunification” 
(Freed Wessler 2011, 5, 17, 27).
Conclusions
Attracting immigrant labor to the United States has played a fundamental role in 
the nation’s economic development throughout its history, and the migratory flows 
have generally adapted to the ups and downs in economic activity. Latin American 
immigrants have become an important component of labor force growth in the 
U.S. over the past few decades. Moreover, there is a clear tendency toward con-
solidating labor market niches for specific groups of immigrants. The demand for 
low-skilled labor to carry out undesirable tasks in low-skilled services, construction, 
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food processing, and light manufacturing for low wages rose considerably in the 
late twentieth century, just as new waves of immigrants from Mexico and other 
Latin American countries arrived who were more than willing to take such jobs. 
Over this period, the labor demand in the U.S. and the labor supply from 
Mexico evolved in such a way that Mexico became the primary source of low-
skilled, low-wage workers in several branches of activity in various parts of the 
U.S. Low-skilled Mexican workers, especially if they are undocumented, have be -
come an ideal source of “disposable labor” that is available “just in time.” They have 
proven to be readily available and easily expendable. They can be easily attracted 
or recruited in boom times and are totally expendable when the economy contracts. 
They can be laid off and even deported with no obligation on the part of, or disad-
vantage for, their employers.
The severe recession in 2008-2009 has momentarily stemmed the arrival of 
new labor migrants, especially the undocumented. Such changes in supply flows 
show the increasing complementarity and a certain degree of de facto integration 
of the Mexican and U.S. labor markets. The supply from Mexico is more or less 
adaptable —or can be forced to adjust— to demand conditions north of the border. 
From 2009 through 2011, given the severity of the recession and the increasingly 
hostile political climate in the U.S., iCe removed an average of 1 000 undocumented 
immigrants a day, and the majority of them were Mexicans. 
My central conclusion is that three conditioning factors have all combined to 
propitiate a hostile climate toward Latin American immigrants: 1) generalized 
anti-immigrant sentiments that flourished after September 11, 2001; 2) the grow-
ing numbers of immigrants, with greatly increased presence in new destinations; 
and 3) the severe recession, beginning at the end of 2007, with high and persistent 
unemployment rates since. This is despite the important role these immigrants 
have played in the country’s economic dynamism in recent decades up until the 
onset of the recession. In several states in the Southeast, these factors interacted 
with vestiges of racism and intolerance present in the region to exacerbate anti-
immigrant feelings and attitudes and facilitate the passing of hostile and punitive 
state laws that would criminalize undocumented immigrants if they are allowed to 
take effect. Therefore, it is likely —and also most unfortunate— that the social 
effects of this deep and prolonged recession will be felt for a considerable time 
after economic growth has been restored because of the anti-immigrant senti-
ments that took root and flourished in the midst of it. 
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